Innocent until Proven (Hypothetically) Guilty: The Third Circuit Condones the Use of Guilt-Assuming Hypotheticals in United States v. Kellogg by Kubilus, Eric M.
Volume 53 Issue 4 Article 2 
2008 
Innocent until Proven (Hypothetically) Guilty: The Third Circuit 
Condones the Use of Guilt-Assuming Hypotheticals in United 
States v. Kellogg 
Eric M. Kubilus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eric M. Kubilus, Innocent until Proven (Hypothetically) Guilty: The Third Circuit Condones the Use of Guilt-
Assuming Hypotheticals in United States v. Kellogg, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 665 (2008). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss4/2 
This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger 
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor 
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2008]
INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN (HYPOTHETICALLY) GUILTY:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT CONDONES THE USE OF
GUILT-ASSUMING HYPOTHETICALS IN UNITED
STATES v. KELLOGG
I. INTRODUCTION
A CCORDING to several researchers, the presumption in favor of the
nnocence of criminal defendants can be traced back to the book of
Deuteronomy, and was "substantially embodied in the laws of Sparta and
Athens."1 To be certain, the presumption of innocence has been "axio-
matic and elementary" to the administration of criminal law in the United
States for at least 113 years. 2 Although the presumption of innocence has
1. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895) (noting that some
scholars claim to find elementary notions of presumption of innocence in ancient
legal systems and biblical passages) (citing SIMON GREENLEAF, III, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 29, at 31 n.1 (Edmund H. Bennett & Chauncey Smith eds.,
1853)). Although Greenleaf noted the possibility that the seeds of the presump-
tion of innocence can be found in the book of Deuteronomy, it can be argued that
the maxim is also illustrated within the Old Testament books of Genesis and Exo-
dus. See Alexander Volokh, Aside, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 173, 178
(1997) (identifying biblical passages loosely related to presumption of innocence);
see also Exodus 23:7 ("Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and
righteous slay thou not . . . ."); Genesis 18:26 ("And the Lord said, If I find in
Sodom fifty righteous within the city then I will spare all the place for their
sakes."). Aside from references within biblical passages and the laws of historical
civilizations, countless scholars throughout history have advanced the presumption
of innocence within their writings. See, e.g., Coffin, 156 U.S. at 454-56 (recounting
references to presumption of innocence by scholars and historical figures such as
Mascardius De Probationibus, Ammianus Marcellinus, Fortescue, Lord Hale,
Blackstone and Lord Gillies); SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT: INSIDE WRONGFUL
CONVICTION CASES 17 (2004) ("Voltaire said, 'It is better to risk saving a guilty
person than to condemn an innocent one'; and Blackstone wrote, 'It is better that
ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer.'"). See generally Kenneth Pen-
nington, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: The Origins of a Legal Maxim, 63 JURIST 106,
106-20 (2003) (detailing historical origins of presumption of innocence and pro-
viding diverse historical references). For example, Lord Hale stated that "[i]n
some cases presumptive evidence goes far to prove a person guilty, tho there be no
express proof of the fact to be committed by him, but then it must be very warily
pressed, for it is better five guilty persons should escape unpunished, than one
innocent person should die." SIR MATTHEw HALE, KNT., I HISTORIA PLACITORUM
CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 289 (1847).
2. See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453-54 (declaring that presumption of innocence is
"unquestioned" in United States criminal jurisprudence); Pennington, supra note
1, at 108 (explaining that presumption of innocence was formally recognized by
Supreme Court for first time in 1895 in Coffin v. United States). Although it is
widely accepted that Coffin was the first Supreme Court case to solidify the pre-
sumption of innocence explicitly as a fundamental principle of criminal law in the
United States, Supreme Court decisions handed down prior to Coffin suggest that
the presumption has always been a part of the American criminal justice system.
See, e.g., Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 439 (1887) (approving jury instruction
(665)
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long been recognized as a touchstone of United States criminal jurispru-
dence, the requirements of this presumption have not yet been fully eluci-
dated.3 Considerable controversy surrounds the nature and extent of
questioning to which the prosecution may subject character witnesses dur-
ing cross-examination. 4 In particular, there is significant debate within
the federal circuits regarding whether the use of guilt-assuming hypotheti-
cals-questions asked by the prosecution on cross-examination that re-
quire the defense's character witness to assume hypothetically that the
defendant is guilty of the charges at bar in order to respond-impermissi-
bly undermines the presumption of innocence to which all criminal de-
fendants are entitled.
5
The majority of the courts of appeals give substantial deference to the
presumption of innocence, and have concluded that the use of guilt-as-
suming hypotheticals is per se inconsistent with that presumption. 6 Despite
adopted by lower court stating that "the law presumes the defendant innocent
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"); Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United
States, 97 U.S. 237, 266 (1877) ("[I]n criminal trials the party accused is entitled to
the legal presumption in favor of innocence, which, in doubtful cases, is always
sufficient to turn the scale in his favor."); see alsoJoseph C. Cascarelli, Presumption of
Innocence and Natural Law: Machiavelli and Aquinas, 41 Am. J. Juus. 229, 230-31
(1996) (suggesting that presumption of innocence is "an important cornerstone of
Justice in Western Civilization").
3. For a discussion of the controversy and confusion within the courts of ap-
peals as to whether the prosecutorial use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals on cross-
examination is consistent with the presumption of innocence, see infra notes 27-34
and accompanying text. For a focused and in-depth discussion of the Third Cir-
cuit's viewpoint regarding the interaction between guilt-assuming hypotheticals
and the presumption of innocence, see infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
4. See Risa Karen Plaskowitz, Cross-Examination of Defendant's Character Witnesses:
In Favor of the Prosecutor's Inquiry Into the Charges at Bar, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 453,
462-76 (1990) (commenting on extensive controversy regarding nature and con-
tent of questions that may properly be asked during cross-examination without
undermining presumption of innocence and violating due process).
5. See id. at 453 (noting that "intense debate" and considerable confusion has
surrounded question regarding admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals under
Federal Rules of Evidence); see also STEPHEN SALTZBURG, TRIAL TACTICS 108 (Jack
Hanna & Kyo Suh eds., 2007) [hereinafter TRIAL TACTICS] ("When a prosecutor
cross-examines a character witness about the very charges for which the defendant
is on trial, the cross-examination may be inconsistent with the presumption of in-
nocence."). See generally Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 453 (describing guilt-assuming
hypotheticals as questions that are "predicated on the very charge for which [the
defendant] is on trial"). For a discussion of the divergent viewpoints espoused by
the circuit courts of appeals regarding the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypothet-
ical questions, see infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
6. See United States v. Shwayder, 312 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W)e
now hold that the use of guilt[-] assuming hypotheticals undermines the presump-
tion of innocence and thus violates a defendant's right to due process."); United
States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) ("The gov-
ernment may not . ..pose hypothetical questions that assume the guilt of the
accused in the very case at bar. These guilt-assuming hypotheticals strike at the
very heart of the presumption of innocence which is fundamental to Anglo-Saxon
concepts of fair trial.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United
States v. Mason, 993 F.2d 406, 409 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[Ajdherance to a basic con-
666
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this majority position, the Third Circuit recently declined to adopt a
bright-line rule of invalidity for guilt-assuming hypotheticals. 7 Rather, in
United States v. Kellogg,8 the Third Circuit determined that guilt-assuming
hypotheticals might properly be asked of opinion character witnesses
under certain limited circumstances that do not implicate the presump-
tion of innocence.9
This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit's recent adoption of the
minority position regarding the propriety and admissibility of guilt-assum-
ing hypotheticals, and further serves as a guide to practitioners in the
cept of our criminal justice system, the presumption of innocence, is not served by
this line of questioning."); United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir.
1990) (noting that guilt-assuming hypotheticals are prohibited "because [they]
create[ ] too great a risk of impairing the presumption of innocence"); United
States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1984) (declaring that it is "error to
allow the prosecution to ask the character witness to assume defendant's guilt of
the offenses for which he is then on trial"); United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172,
177 (7th Cir. 1984) (agreeing with other courts that guilt-assuming questions "as-
sume[ ] away the presumption of innocence"); see also CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, 3
JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 16.41, at 204 (7th ed. 1998) ("The pre-
vailing view is that it is improper to ask a character witness a question such as,
'Would your opinion of the defendant's character change if you learned (or
heard) that defendant had [engaged in the conduct alleged in the indictment]?'
Such questions, according to several courts, assume the defendant's guilt, thereby
unfairly undermining the presumption of innocence .. "); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
1 HANDBOOK or FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 405.1, at 494 n.25 (5th ed. 2001) (noting that
use of guilt-assuming hypothetical is generally held to be improper because "such
... questions possess[ ] no probative value, assume facts which are the subject of
the litigation, and destroy[ ] the presumption of innocence"); STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG, 2 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 405.02[12], at 405-14 (8th ed.
2002) [hereinafter FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL] (noting that "[m]ost
courts have found it to be impermissible to ask guilt-assuming hypothetical ques-
tions of any witnesses who have testified about the defendant's good character"
because "defendant is likely to suffer prejudice if guilt is assumed, albeit hypotheti-
cally"); PAUL MARK SANDLER & JAMES K. ARCHIBALD, MODEL WITNESS EXAMINATIONS
219 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that it is "reversible error" for guilt-assuming hypotheti-
cal to be asked and therefore "guilt-assuming hypotheticals should not be asked of
character witnesses"). But see United States v. Kellogg, 510 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir.
2007) (declining to adopt bright-line rule prohibiting use of guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals because there is "nothing inherent in guilt-assuming hypotheticals"
that makes them run awry of presumption of innocence); United States v. White,
887 F.2d 267, 274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting view that guilt-assuming hypotheti-
cals are necessarily inconsistent with presumption of innocence).
7. Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 ("We . . .see no need to adopt a bright-line rule
prohibiting a potentially probative type of inquiry."). In so holding, the Third
Circuit aligned itself with the District of Columbia Circuit, thereby becoming one
of the only two circuits explicitly condoning the use of guilt-assuming hypotheti-
cals under certain circumstances. See White, 887 F.2d at 274-75 (holding that
"cross-examination of witnesses who ... give their own opinion of the defendant's
character is not error").
8. Kellogg, 510 F.3d 188.
9. See id. at 196 (upholding use of guilt-assuming hypothetical during cross-
examination of Kellogg's opinion character witness and noting that admissibility of
such questions depends on facts and circumstances of each individual case).
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Third Circuit who may proffer or defend against such questions.' 0 Part II
summarizes and reviews the specific Federal Rules of Evidence (the Rules)
that govern the admissibility of character evidence, and further details the
views espoused by the federal courts of appeals regarding the propriety of
guilt-assuming hypotheticals under the Rules."' Part III provides an analy-
sis of United States v. Kellogg and sets forth the reasoning and rationale
behind the Third Circuit's divergence from the majority in its rejection of
a per se rule of invalidity for the use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals. 12 Part
IV concludes by providing practical guidance for practitioners in the
Third Circuit, and identifies principles that will assist in the use of, or de-
fense against, guilt-assuming hypothetical questions.
13
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence: Character Evidence
Under Rules 404 and 405
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), the general provision regarding the
admissibility of character evidence, states that "[e]vidence of a person's
character.. . is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in con-
formity therewith on a particular occasion." 14 This general prohibition on
10. For an overview of the facts giving rise to the Kelloggcase, and a discussion
of the rationale behind the Third Circuit's adoption of the minority position con-
cerning the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, see infra notes 47-86 and accompanying text.
11. For an overview of the Federal Rules of Evidence applicable to the contro-
versy regarding the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals, see infra notes 14-
26 and accompanying text. For a survey of the views espoused by the circuit courts
of appeals regarding the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypothetical questions
under the Rules, see infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text. Prior to Kellogg, the
Third Circuit had not addressed the propriety of guilt-assuming hypotheticals; for
a discussion of Third Circuit jurisprudence that provided the foundation for the
Kellogg decision, see infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
12. For a detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Kellogg and the
divergent viewpoint espoused by the court regarding the admissibility of guilt-as-
suming hypotheticals, see infra notes 47-91 and accompanying text.
13. For suggestions to Third Circuit practitioners who may proffer or defend
against guilt assuming-hypothetical questions after Kellogg, see infra notes 92-112
and accompanying text.
14. FED. R. EVin. 404(a). McCormick defines character as "a generalized
description of a person's disposition, or of the disposition in respect to a general
trait, such as honesty, temperance or peacefulness." 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 195, at 686 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (providing definition for charac-
ter); accord GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 404.1, at 349 ("Character is the nature of a
person, his disposition generally, or his disposition in respect to a particular trait
such as peacefulness or truthfulness."). Questions regarding the admissibility of
character evidence generally arise in two basic situations. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)
advisory committee's note to the 1972 Proposed Rules (describing possible uses of
character evidence). First, one may seek to introduce character evidence in "char-
acter in issue" cases, where the character of the accused is directly at issue as an
element of the case or controversy that must be proven. See id. (describing possi-
ble direct use of character evidence in character at issue cases). Another more
controversial situation where questions regarding the admissibility of character evi-
[Vol. 53: p. 665
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the use of character evidence is founded on a recognition that character
evidence can have a tendency to confuse juries, prejudice the accused and
unduly delay a trial's progress.15 Despite this general aversion to the use
of character evidence, the Rules afford criminal defendants the right to
introduce evidence regarding pertinent character traits of themselves or
the purported victim. 16 This so-called "mercy rule" is afforded to criminal
defendants to assist them in opposing the particularly "strong investigative
and prosecutorial resources of the government. 1 7 Although the prosecu-
dence arise is when such evidence is to be used circumstantially. See id. (noting
possible circumstantial use of character evidence). Character evidence is used cir-
cumstantially when it is offered for the "purpose of suggesting an inference that
the person acted on the occasion in question consistently with his character." See
id. (providing loose definition for circumstantial use of character evidence).
15. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendments
(noting potentially adverse impact that circumstantial use of character evidence
can have on fairness and progression ofjudicial proceedings); Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (noting that character evidence "is not rejected
because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with
the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge"); FISHMAN,
supra note 6, § 14.1, at 3 (noting general distrust for character evidence in legal
community and describing such evidence as "distracting, time-consuming, and
likely to influence ajury far beyond its legitimate probative value"); GRAHAM, supra
note 6, § 404.1, at 351 (stating that "[c]haracter evidence is of slight probative
value and can be very prejudicial" in that it "distract[s] the trier of fact from the
main question of what actually happened on the particular occasion [," and "re-
ward[s] the good man and... punish[es] the bad man because of their respective
characters despite what evidence in the case shows actually happened"); 1 MCCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 188, at 654 ("Character evidence ... while
typically being of relatively slight value, usually is laden with the dangerous bag-
gage of prejudice, distraction, and time-consumption."); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER
& LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 4.12, at 263-64
(2d ed. 1999) (noting that admission of character evidence can lead to inaccurate
presumptions about accused's actions at given time, diversion from questions at
bar, undue prejudice, waste of time and denial of fair trial); Anne Bowen Poulin,
Credibility: A Fair Subject forExpert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1015 (2007) (stat-
ing that "questions of character can be unduly distracting and may inject unfair
prejudice into a trial" and therefore "character evidence is strictly limited as to
admissibility and, when admissible, as to form"). But see Chris William Sanchirico,
Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1254 (2001) ("A
past record, then, will be somewhat more associated with innocent defendants
within the subset of cases that make it to trial than within the full population of
cases. Consequently, a past record exhibited at trial will be less indicative of guilt
(and perhaps, if this effect dominates, indicative of innocence)."); Peter Tillers,
What Is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 785-93 (1998) (sug-
gesting that rule of inadmissibility for character evidence is not strongly supported
by undue prejudice rationale).
16. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (1)-(2) (providing criminal defendants with right
to introduce evidence pertaining to character of self or purported victim); Ste-
phen A. Saltzburg, Guilt Assuming Hypotheticals: Basic Character Evidence Rules, 20
CRIM. JUST. 47, 47 (2006) (noting that Rule 404(a) "gives the accused an opportu-
nity to offer predisposition evidence that is otherwise generally inadmissible").
17. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, § 4.12, at 265-66 (stating that
criminal defendants have historically been permitted to submit evidence of good
character to assist in their defense against prosecution's vast resources); see also
5
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tion does not initially share in this right, the defense "opens the door" by
submitting its own character evidence, thereby granting the prosecution
the ability to rebut the same. 18
Whereas Rule 404 details the circumstances under which character
evidence is admissible, Rule 405 describes the methods for introducing
such evidence. 19 In all cases in which character evidence is deemed ad-
missible under Rule 404, Rule 405 allows proof of character to be offered
on direct examination through the introduction and use of reputation evi-
dence or opinion evidence; during cross-examination, the Rule permits
FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendments (noting that
mercy rule is provided to protect accused whose life and/or liberty may be at
stake); Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476 (noting that although character evidence may not
be proffered by prosecution, admission of such evidence is "opened to the defen-
dant because character is relevant in resolving probabilities of guilt"); 1 McCoR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 14, § 191, at 673 n.2 (stating that mercy rule "has
been characterized as an amelioration of the 'brutal rigors' of the early criminal
law"); Josephine Ross, "He Looks Guilty": Reforming Good Character Evidence to Under-
cut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. Prrr. L. REv. 227, 235 (2004) (noting that mercy
rule is provided to criminal defendants along with "the presumption of innocence,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to confront one's accusers, as one
of the hallmarks of a system designed to protect the accused"); Saltzburg, supra
note 16, at 47 ("The accused in a criminal case has the right to offer evidence of a
pertinent character trait in order to cast doubt on whether he or she would com-
mit the crime charged by the government.").
18. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible . . . except: (1) In a criminal case, evidence of a perti-
nent trait of character offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same
.... ") (emphasis added); Ross, supra note 17, at 235 ("[T]he defense chooses
whether character evidence will be part of the trial and it appears that the govern-
ment may not bring up propensity or bad character unless the defense raises good
character."). In presenting his or her own character witnesses, the defendant
opens the door to cross-examination by the prosecution and risks having his or her
character witnesses discredited. See Michelson, 335 U.S. at 479 ("The price a defen-
dant must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open the entire
subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make himself vulnera-
ble where the law otherwise shields him."); TRIAL TACTICS, supra note 5, at 105
(noting that defense takes risk when calling character witnesses because prosecu-
tion gains ability to cross-examine and possibly impeach those witnesses' testimony
thereafter); Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 47 ("Calling a character witness is not with-
out risk, however. The principal risk is that the witness may be cross-examined
about specific acts that are inconsistent with the character to which the witness
attests.").
19. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note to 1972 Proposed Rules
("Once the admissibility of character evidence in some form is established under
this rule, reference must then be made to Rule 405 ... in order to determine the
appropriate method of proof."); FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note to
1972 Proposed Rules ("The rule deals only with allowable methods of proving
character, not with the admissibility of character evidence, which is covered by
Rule 404."); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAiRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 2 FEDERAL EvI-
DENCE § 4.41, at 3 (3d ed., 2007) [hereinafter FEDERAL EVIDENCE] ("[Rule] 405
prescribes the manner in which character ... may be proved, but without answer-
ing the question when character evidence may be received. It is the latter question
that is resolved in [Rule] 404.").
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direct inquiries into specific instances of the accused's misconduct. 20 Rep-
utation character evidence is defined as testimony provided by a witness
regarding the "defendant's reputation in the community for the character
trait at issue." 21 Opinion character evidence, on the other hand, is de-
scribed as testimony provided by a witness regarding "his or her own per-
sonal opinion of any facet of the defendant's character."
22
Because the Rules fail to place constraints upon the prosecution's
ability to inquire into "relevant specific instances of conduct" on cross-
examination, or upon the nature of witnesses to whom such questions
might be asked, a great deal of controversy surrounds this third method of
introducing character evidence. 23 Much of this controversy revolves
around two questions: (1) whether the prosecution may ask guilt-assuming
hypotheticals during cross-examination, and, if so, (2) to which categories
of character witnesses such hypothetical questions may be asked.2 4 Al-
though the Supreme Court has been presented with various opportunities
to settle this uncertain area of the law, the Court has specifically declined
to do so to date. 25 Lacking any guidance from the Supreme Court, a
20. See FED. R. EVID. 405(a) (providing allowable methods of proving charac-
ter). Rule 405(a) states that "[i] n all cases in which evidence of character or a trait
of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to repu-
tation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is
allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct." Id.
21. United States v. Kellogg, 510 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
United States v. Curtis, 644 F.2d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also Michelson, 335
U.S. at 477 (noting that reputation witnesses "summarize what [they have] heard
in the community" and describe "the shadow [the defendant's] daily life has cast
in his neighborhood"); Note, A Comparison and Analysis of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and New York Evidentiary Law, Rule 405: Methods ofProving Character, 12 ToURO
L. REV. 413, 418 (1996) [hereinafter Comparison and Analysis] ("Reputation evi-
dence is testimony as to the general reputation of the person in the community
.... "); Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 458 (noting that reputation witnesses testify
regarding "degree to which the community regards the defendant as a person who
is honest and truthful").
22. Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 193 (internal quotations omitted); accord Comparison
and Analysis, supra note 21, at 18 ("[O]pinion evidence is the personal opinion of
the witness concerning the person's character.").
23. See Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 459, 466-67 (describing controversy over
extent to which prosecution may ask questions regarding specific instances of ac-
cused's conduct, in particular whether use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals is
proper).
24. See id. (noting that "[t]here is considerable debate whether it is permissi-
ble for a prosecutor, on cross-examination of the defendant's character witness, to
pose questions that are based upon the charges at bar," and if so, whether they
may be asked of both reputation and opinion character witnesses); see also FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 405.02[12], at 405-13 ("A... difficult
question is whether the witness can be tested by an assumption of the defendant's
guilt as to the crime charged.").
25. See Shwayder v. United States, 540 U.S. 826 (2003) (mem.) (denying certi-
orari and declining opportunity to settle controversy regarding admissibility of
guilt-assuming hypotheticals); Oshatz v. United States, 500 U.S. 910 (1991) (mem.)
(same); McGuire v. United States, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985) (mem.) (same).
7
Kubilus: Innocent until Proven (Hypothetically) Guilty: The Third Circuit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
widening split is forming within the circuit courts regarding the propriety
and admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals under the Rules.26
B. The Circuit Courts' Application of Rule 405(a) to
Guilt-Assuming Hypotheticals
A great deal of case law has addressed the use of guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals on cross-examination; however, the courts have been inconsis-
tent in their consideration of the admissibility of such questions. 2 7 In
large measure, the distinction drawn between opinion and reputation
character witnesses has provided the fuel for this controversy. 28 With re-
spect to reputation witnesses, each circuit that has addressed the propriety
of guilt-assuming hypotheticals on cross-examination has held such ques-
tions to be improper. 29 On the other hand, there is a great deal of contro-
26. For a discussion of the divergent viewpoints espoused by the federal
courts of appeals with respect to the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals in
the absence of any guidance from the Supreme Court, see infra notes 27-34 and
accompanying text.
27. Compare United States v. Shwayder, 312 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002)
(prohibiting use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals regardless of whether they are
posed to opinion or reputation character witnesses), United States v. Guzman, 167
F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (same), United States v. Mason, 993
F.2d 406, 409 (4th Cir. 1993) (same), United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 539
(2d Cir. 1990) (same), United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 177 (7th Cir. 1984)
(same), and United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1984) (same),
with Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 195-96 (prohibiting use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals
when cross-examining reputation witnesses but allowing such questions when
posed to opinion character witnesses), and United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267,
274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same). The Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of
Appeals have all held guilt-assuming hypotheticals to be improper when asked of
reputation character witnesses, but have yet to issue opinions specifically address-
ing the admissibility of such questions when cross-examining opinion character
witnesses. See United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding
guilt-assuming hypotheticals improper when asked of reputation character witness
but making no explicit mention of their propriety with respect to opinion charac-
ter witnesses); United States v. Polsinelli, 649 F.2d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1981)
(same); United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez, 547 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1977)
(same). The First Circuit was presented with an opportunity to address the admis-
sibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals but declined to address the issue, holding
that any error would have been harmless. See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d
456, 485 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining opportunity to address admissibility of guilt-
assuming hypothetical questions).
28. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 195 (indicating that admissibility of guilt-assuming
hypotheticals turns on "meaningful distinction between reputation and opinion
character witnesses"); White, 887 F.2d at 274 (basing admissibility of guilt-assuming
hypotheticals on distinction between reputation and opinion witnesses with re-
spect to extent of allowable cross-examination); Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 467
(explaining that several circuits distinguish between treatment of opinion and rep-
utation character witnesses); Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 49 (noting that type of
testimony provided may alter permissible scope of cross-examination). For a re-
view of the distinction between reputation and opinion character witnesses, see
supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
29. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 (holding that "posing a guilt-assuming hypo-
thetical to a reputation character witness is improper"); Shwayder, 312 F.3d at 1121
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versy regarding the use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals to challenge the
credibility of witnesses providing opinion testimony regarding the defen-
dant's character.
30
Although no consensus has been reached, the majority of circuit
courts that have addressed the issue have held guilt-assuming hypotheti-
cals to be improper regardless of whether they are asked of reputation or
opinion character witnesses. 31 These courts based their decisions largely
(same); Guzman, 167 F.3d at 1352 (same); Mason, 993 F.2d at 408 (same); Oshatz,
912 F.2d at 539 (same); Barta, 888 F.2d at 1224 (same); White, 887 F.2d at 274
(same); McGuire, 744 F.2d at 1204 (same); Williams, 738 F.2d at 177 (same); Pol-
sinelli, 649 F.2d at 798 (same); Candelaria-Gonzalez, 547 F.2d at 294 (same).
30. Compare Shwayder, 312 F.3d at 1121 (declaring that guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals may not be asked of opinion character witnesses), Guzman, 167 F.3d at
1352 (same), Mason, 993 F.2d at 409 (same), Oshatz, 912 F.2d at 539 (same), Wil-
liams, 738 F.2d at 177 (same), and McGuire, 744 F.2d at 1204 (same), with Kellogg,
510 F.3d at 196 (rejecting per se ban on guilt-assuming hypotheticals asked of opin-
ion character witnesses and holding that determination of admissibility must be
carried out on case-by-case basis), and White, 887 F.2d at 274-75 (same).
31. See Shwayder, 312 F.3d at 1122 (stating general rule that "asking character
witnesses hypothetical questions that assume the defendant's guilt during cross-
examination is error"); Guzman, 167 F.3d at 1352 (holding that "[t]he government
may not ... pose hypothetical questions that assume the guilt of the accused in the
very case at bar[ ]" regardless of whether they are asked of reputation or opinion
witnesses); Mason, 993 F.2d at 409 ("[C]ondemn[ing] the use of guilt-assuming
hypothetical questions asked of lay character witnesses, whether testifying about a
defendant's reputation in the community for a character trait or expressing an
opinion about a trait."); Oshatz, 912 F.2d at 539 (holding "guilt-assuming hypothet-
ical questions asked of lay character witnesses ... whether testifying about a defen-
dant's reputation for a character trait or expressing an opinion about such a
trait[ ]" improper); Williams, 738 F.2d at 177 (declaring guilt-assuming hypotheti-
cals improper under all circumstances); McGuire, 744 F.2d at 1204 ("It would be
error to allow the prosecution to ask the character witness to assume defendant's
guilt of the offenses for which he is then on trial."); see also FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 405.02[12], at 405-14 (noting that most courts
have adopted bright-line rule prohibiting use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals);
FISHMAN, supra note 6, § 16.41, at 204 (noting majority position that guilt-assuming
hypotheticals are inconsistent with presumption of innocence under all circum-
stances); GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 405.1, at 494 (same). But see Kellogg, 510 F.3d at
196 (denying necessity of adopting bright-line rule prohibiting use of guilt-assum-
ing hypotheticals when cross-examining opinion character witnesses); White, 887
F.2d at 274 ("Cross-examination of witnesses who testify only to the defendant's
community reputation with hypotheticals assuming guilt may be improper. How-
ever, similar cross-examination of witnesses who ... give their own opinion of the
defendant's character is not error."). One popular treatise advocates strongly for
the adoption of a per se rule of invalidity for the use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals:
It is critical to block questions that would ask whether the witness would
alter his opinion or assessment, or whether the reputation would change,
if the defendant were in fact guilty of the charged crime. Such 'guilt-
assuming' hypothetical questions are objectionable on many grounds.
They let the prosecutor assume guilt in questioning the witness and in-
vited the jury to be careless in its thinking, which blatantly undermines
the presumption of innocence, and they beg the question to which the
character evidence related by suggesting that a good opinion cannot be
valid because it is already known that the defendant is guilty when that is
the whole point of holding a trial and offering character evidence.
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upon the belief that the use of such questions has the potential to under-
mine the presumption of innocence in violation of the accused's right to
due process. 32 Until the Third Circuit's recent decision in United States v.
Kellogg, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
was the sole court to have adopted the view that guilt-assuming hypotheti-
cal questions may be asked of opinion character witnesses.3 3 Other circuit
courts have addressed the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals
with respect to reputation witnesses, but have not yet passed judgment on
the admissibility of such questions when cross-examining opinion charac-
ter witnesses.3 4
C. Early Third Circuit Jurisprudence Related to the
Propriety of Guilt-Assuming Questions
Although United States v. Kellogg marked the Third Circuit's first ex-
plicit consideration of the propriety of guilt-assuming hypotheticals, the
principles underlying the court's decision were set forth in the circuit
FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 4:43, at 34.
32. See Shwayder, 312 F.3d at 1121 ("[T]he use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals
undermines the presumption of innocence and thus violates a defendant's right to
due process."); Guzman, 167 F.3d at 1352 ("These guilt-assuming hypotheticals
strike at the very heart of the presumption of innocence .... (quoting Candelaria-
Gonzalez, 547 F.2d at 294)); Mason, 993 F.2d at 409 ("[A]dherence to a basic con-
cept of our justice system, the presumption of innocence, is not served by this line
of questioning." (citing Oshatz, 912 F.2d at 539)); Williams, 738 F.2d at 177 (finding
that guilt-assuming hypotheticals "assume[ ] away the presumption of inno-
cence"); see also Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 48 ("When a prosecutor cross-examines
a character witness about the very charges for which the defendant is on trial, the
cross-examination may be inconsistent with the presumption of innocence to
which the defendant is entitled.").
33. See White, 887 F.2d at 274-75 (holding that guilt-assuming hypotheticals
are not categorically erroneous when asked of opinion character witness). In 1990
Judge Mukasey, in his concurring opinion in Oshatz, advocated the position
adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in White. See Oshatz, 912 F.2d at 544
(Mukasey, J., concurring) (suggesting that guilt-assuming hypotheticals are valua-
ble, relevant and necessary in determining credibility of opinion character
witnesses).
34. See United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1225 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
guilt-assuming hypotheticals "exceed the bounds of propriety" when addressed to
reputation witnesses, but failing to address propriety of such questions in regards
to opinion witnesses); United States v. Polsinelli, 649 F.2d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1981)
(" [N] othing contained herein should be considered as any indication that [guilt-
assuming hypotheticals] would have been proper had the character witnesses ex-
pressed their personal opinion .... That particular matter is not before us.");
Candelaria-Gonzalez, 547 F.2d at 294-95 (holding guilt-assuming hypotheticals im-
proper when asked of reputation witness, but failing to address same issue with
respect to opinion witnesses). Again, although the First Circuit has been
presented with an opportunity to weigh-in on the admissibility of guilt-assuming
hypotheticals, the court declined to do so. See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d
456, 485 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to address admissibility of guilt-assuming hypo-
thetical questions and resolving case on other grounds).
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court's holding in United States v. Curtis.35 Curtis involved a criminal defen-
dant charged with three counts of methamphetamine distribution and ille-
gal possession of a firearm. 3 6 At trial, the defense called four character
witnesses to present reputation testimony regarding the defendant's excel-
lent standing within the community. 37 During the cross-examination of
those witnesses, the defense objected to a number of improper attempts
by the prosecution to elicit information regarding the witnesses' opinions
of the defendant-opinions that had not been expressed during direct
examination.3 8 The trial judge overruled the defense's objections; those
rulings provided the basis for the defendant's argument on appeal. 39
On appeal, the Third Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that
Rule 405(a) authorizes the prosecution to question defense character wit-
nesses regarding specific instances of conduct that are relevant to "the
accuracy of the character witnesses' testimony. '40 The court noted that
when a character witness provides reputation testimony on direct exami-
nation, "inquiry may [thereafter] be made about conduct, and even about
charges, which may have come to the attention of the relevant commu-
nity. '' 4 1 On the other hand, the court noted that opinion character wit-
nesses may be cross-examined as to any information "which bears on the
fact or factual basis for formation of the opinion."4 2 The court, noting
this crucial distinction, held that "an opinion witness can be cross-ex-
amined only on matters bearing on his own opinion, while a reputation
witness can only be examined on matters reasonably proximate to the time of
the alleged offense and likely to have been known to the relevant community
at that time."
43
35. See United States v. Curtis, 644 F.2d 263, 268-70 (3d Cir. 1981) (elucidating
distinction between reputation and opinion character witnesses, thereby providing
basis for Third Circuit's decision in Kellogg).
36. See id. at 264 (describing charges brought against defendant in Curtis).
37. See id. at 265 (recounting defense's decision to call and question four
character witnesses regarding Curtis's reputation within his community).
38. See id. at 265-67 (detailing questions asked of Curtis's character witnesses
by prosecution and noting objections raised by defense counsel at trial regarding
improper questions posed by prosecution as to witnesses' opinions of defendant).
39. See id. (detailing court's rulings on numerous objections raised by defense
counsel to questions posed by prosecution on cross-examination and noting this as
providing basis for appeal).
40. See id. at 267-68 (noting that Rule 405 "provides that on cross-examina-
tion, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct" and that "rele-
vant specific instances of conduct are only instances going to the accuracy of the
character witnesses' testimony") (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See id. at 268 (delineating scope and extent of cross-examination allowed
when questioning reputation character witnesses).
42. See id. (noting broader scope of cross-examination that is permissible
when questioning opinion character witnesses).
43. See id. at 269 (reiterating permissible scope of cross-examination with re-
spect to opinion and reputation character witnesses and "remind[ing] trial judges,
prosecutors and defense attorneys that Evidence Rule 405(a) has not effected a
merger between reputation and opinion evidence").
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The court declared that questions posed to reputation witnesses
should focus on the defendant's reputation at a time reasonably contem-
poraneous with the acts charged, rather than his or her reputation after
the filing of the charges under consideration. 4 4 According to the court,
this rule limits the possibility that the "accused's reputation could well be
affected by the gossip which accompanies an indictment, and thus might
not be a fair reflection of his character."45 In holding that reputation wit-
nesses should not be questioned regarding the charges at bar, but that
opinion witnesses might be questioned upon any matter which may have
affected the opinion proffered, Curtis provided the foundation for the
Third Circuit's decision in Kellogg.4 6
III. WIDENING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: UNITED STATES V. KELLOGG
In United States v. Kellogg, the Third Circuit expressly addressed, as a
matter of first impression, the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypothetical
questions. 47 Relying upon the distinction between opinion and reputa-
tion witnesses drawn in Curtis, the Third Circuit declined to adopt a per se
rule of invalidity for guilt-assuming hypotheticals-thereby rejecting the
approach taken by the majority of circuit courts.48 Rather, the court held
that although guilt-assuming questions may not be proffered to reputation
witnesses, they may be asked of opinion character witnesses under certain
circumstances.
49
44. See id. at 268 (noting time period within which reputation in relevant com-
munity is probative and admissible).
45. See id. at 268-69 (explaining equitable rationale behind requirement that
reputation evidence presented must relate to accused's reputation reasonably con-
temporaneous with acts charged rather than at time of indictment or trial where
undue prejudice could distort accused's overall standing in community).
46. See United States v. Kellogg, 510 F.3d 188, 193-95 (3d Cir. 2007) (relying
on Curtis as foundation for decision to adopt minority position regarding admissi-
bility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals). Because the indictment and trial of the ac-
cused can certainly affect a character witness's opinion of the accused, Curtis seems
to explicitly state that questions regarding the charges at bar should be allowed
during cross-examination. Cf Curtis, 644 F.2d at 269 (providing unqualified rule
that "opinion witness can be cross[-] examined.., on matters bearing on his or her
own opinion").
47. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 190 (noting issue on appeal as challenge to use of
guilt-assuming hypothetical by prosecution on cross-examination of character wit-
nesses); see also Posting of Brett Sweitzer to Third Circuit Blog, http://circuit3.
blogspot.com/2007/12/court-widens-circuit-split-on-guilt.html (Dec. 19, 2007)
(noting that Third Circuit ruled on propriety of guilt-assuming hypotheticals for
first time in Kellogg, thereby widening existing circuit split as to that issue).
48. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 ("We ... see no need to adopt a bright-line
rule prohibiting a potentially probative type of inquiry.").
49. See id. at 196 (agreeing that "posing guilt-assuming hypothetical[s] to a
reputation character witness is improper" but nevertheless allowing such questions
when posed to opinion character witnesses).
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A. Factual Background and Procedural Posture of Kellogg
Between May 1998 and March 1999, Edward V. Kellogg was the
owner, acting President and Quality Control Officer ofJohnston Laborato-
ries. 50 Johnston Laboratories provided analytical testing services to its cus-
tomers, many of whom were required to comply with stringent regulations
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. 5 1 In particular, a
number of Johnston Laboratories' customers were required to comply
with an EPA protocol commonly referred to as "Method 601/602."52
Under Kellogg's direction, Johnston Laboratories contracted with numer-
ous customers for the specific purpose of performing the Method 601/602
analysis despite the fact that Johnston Laboratories lacked the proper
equipment to complete these tests.
53
Lacking the proper equipment to fulfill its obligations, Johnston Lab-
oratories entered into a subcontract with another laboratory to carry out
these analyses.5 4 To the detriment of Johnston's customers, the subcon-
tracting laboratory also lacked the equipment necessary to properly carry
out the Method 601/602 analysis.
55
Though aware that neither Johnston Laboratories nor the subcon-
tracting laboratory could carry out the proper analysis, Kellogg neverthe-
less authorized the subcontractor to analyze the customers' samples using
a less sensitive test method, one unable to comply with Method 601/602's
requirements. 56 Knowing that these results were not obtained using the
appropriate test method, Kellogg caused Johnston Laboratories to mail
results stating that EPA Method 601/602 had, in fact, been used; Johnston
Laboratories subsequently billed its customers accordingly. 5 7 For these ac-
tions, the government charged Kellogg with thirty-four counts of mail
fraud. 58
At Kellogg's trial in the district court, the defense called a number of
character witnesses to testify as to Kellogg's excellent reputation in the
50. See id. at 190 (identifying nature of Kellogg's position at Johnston
Laboratories).
51. See id. (describing nature of Johnston Laboratories' business and cus-
tomer base).
52. See id. (identifying particular EPA protocol requirements for Johnston
Laboratories' customers).
53. See id. (detailing Kellogg's decision to take on business despite lacking
proper equipment to carry out such analyses).
54. See id. (noting subcontracting arrangement entered into with Hydro-Anal-
ysis Associates, Inc.).
55. See id. ("Hydro-Analysis also could not and did not perform VOC testing
under Method 601/602.").
56. See id. ("Kellogg authorized Hydro-Analysis to test the water samples of
Johnston Laboratories' customers using the less sensitive method.").
57. See id. (describing Kellogg's commission of mail fraud by sending fraudu-
lent reports and bills to customers).
58. See id. (describing nature of charges brought against Kellogg).
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community as a law-abiding citizen, and as to their personal opinions of
his character.59 After an instance of such testimony, the prosecution
asked one of Kellogg's character witnesses the following question on cross-
examination:
Prosecutor: Sir, would you agree with me that a person who
knows that a laboratory used one particular analytical method,
but then who reports out a completely different analytical
method on final reports of analysis to its customers, would your
opinion be different about that person being a law abiding
citizen?
Witness: Is this a hypothetical question, or is this specific to this
case?
Prosecutor: I'm asking you a hypothetical question.
Witness: I think my opinion would be different.
60
Kellogg objected to this question, arguing that it was an impermissible
guilt-assuming hypothetical. 61 The trial judge overruled the objection and
immediately issued a brief instruction to the jury regarding both the na-
ture of the question and the extent to which it might be considered. 62
Kellogg was ultimately convicted of thirty-four counts of mail fraud, and
59. See id. at 191-93 (noting that Kellogg called two character witnesses at trial
and describing nature of direct testimony and cross-examination of each).
60. See id. at 192 (detailing prosecution's use of guilt-assuming hypothetical
against one character witness called by Kellogg).
61. See id. (noting defense counsel's objection to guilt-assuming hypothetical
question posed by prosecutor to one of Kellogg's character witnesses). Although
this Casebrief discusses only one character witness called by Kellogg, Kellogg in
fact called two such witnesses at trial. See id. at 191-93 (discussing examination and
cross-examination of two character witnesses called by Kellogg). Kellogg objected
to questions posed by the prosecution during the cross-examination of each char-
acter witness on the grounds that the questions proffered were impermissible guilt-
assuming hypotheticals. See id. (noting objections raised by Kellogg regarding
questions posed by prosecution during cross-examination of both character wit-
nesses). During the government's cross-examination of Kellogg's first character
witness, Kellogg objected to the following question on the grounds that it forced
the witness to assume Kellogg's guilt: "Do you have any knowledge about the way
Mr. Kellogg ran his environmental laboratory back in 1998?" See id. at 191 (ex-
plaining question objected to during cross-examination of first character witness).
The district court allowed this question to proceed, noting that "the government
may test the opinions concerning character, and the testimony concerning reputa-
tion, by testing the witness's knowledge of the defendant and his business." See id.
(quoting district court's rationale for allowing challenged question to proceed).
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that this question did not assume the guilt of
the defendant, but rather was properly admitted under Rule 405(a) to test the
foundation for the witness's opinion of Kellogg. See id. at 192 (noting Third Cir-
cuit's holding that question asked did not force witness to assume guilt of defen-
dant in any manner).
62. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 192 (noting that district court overruled Kellogg's
objections and instructed jury thereafter regarding use and weight that should be
given to reputation and opinion testimony provided by witness).
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appealed from that judgment, arguing that "the District Court violated
[Kellogg's] right to due process and erred under Federal Rule of Evidence
405(a) by permitting the government to pose a question that assumed [he
was] guilty of the charged offense." 63
B. The Third Circuit Tackles Guilt-Assuming Hypotheticals
1. Guilt-Assuming Hypotheticals Held Per Se Invalid Wen Posed to
Reputation Character Witnesses
The Third Circuit began its analysis in Kellogg by providing an over-
view of the current legal landscape regarding the admissibility of guilt-
assuming hypotheticals. 64 After noting that the majority of circuits that
have had an opportunity to address the issue have disregarded any distinc-
tion between reputation and opinion evidence, the court found guilt-as-
suming hypotheticals to be improper when asked of witnesses providing
either type of testimony.65 The court explained that these circuits have
based their decisions on two primary rationales: (1) that the use of guilt-
assuming hypotheticals has the ability to undermine the presumption of
innocence in violation of due process; and/or (2) that the probative value
of any such question is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect it
might have on the accused.
66
The Kellogg court immediately began to stray from the majority of the
circuits by stating that the propriety of guilt-assuming hypotheticals "turns
on the meaningful distinction between reputation and opinion character
witnesses." 67 Nevertheless, the court joined its sister circuits in unani-
mously holding that guilt-assuming hypotheticals may not be asked of rep-
63. See id. at 193 (noting judgment entered against Kellogg and argument
raised by Kellogg on appeal).
64. See id. at 193-95 (detailing views espoused by other circuits regarding pro-
priety and admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals during cross-examination
of defense character witnesses). For a detailed discussion of the circuit courts'
divergent views regarding the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals, see
supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
65. See id. at 194 (noting that majority of circuits have disallowed use of guilt-
assuming questions on wholesale basis). For a discussion of the majority viewpoint
regarding the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals, see supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
66. See id. at 194-95 (noting various rationales offered by circuit courts asjusti-
fication for adoption of bright-line rule banning all use of guilt-assuming ques-
tions). For a further discussion of the reasoning and rationale behind the circuit
courts' adoption of the majority position prohibiting the use of guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
67. See id. at 195 (reverting to prior line drawn in Curtis and adopting diver-
gent view that admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals turns on distinction be-
tween opinion and reputation witnesses). For a review of the distinction between
reputation and opinion character witnesses, see supra notes 21-22 and accompany-
ing text. Further, for a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Curtis concern-
ing the application of the opinion/reputation distinction with respect to the cross-
examination of character witnesses, see supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
CASEBRIEF 6792008]
15
Kubilus: Innocent until Proven (Hypothetically) Guilty: The Third Circuit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
utation character witnesses. 68 The court's foundation for this holding
rested on the definition of a reputation witness, as well as the court's prior
decision in Curtis.69 In Curtis, the court noted that "[a] reputation witness
can only be examined on matters reasonably proximate to the time of the alleged
offense and likely to have been made known to the relevant community at
that time."70 Relying on this precedent and referring to the basic defini-
tion of a reputation witness, the court held that:
[b]ecause a reputation character witness, by definition, can only
provide testimony about the defendant's reputation in the com-
munity, a person testifying regarding the defendant's reputation
at the time of the crime can only speculate about how informa-
tion regarding the crime would affect the community's assess-
ment of the defendant, and a witness's speculation in that regard
is of no probative value at all. 71
In so holding, the Third Circuit aligned with the majority and adopted a
bright-line rule that the prosecution may not question reputation charac-
ter witnesses with guilt-assuming hypotheticals under any circumstances.
72
2. Panel Rejects Per Se Rule of Invalidity for Guilt-Assuming Hypotheticals
Posed to Opinion Character Witnesses
After disposing of the issue with respect to reputation witnesses, the
court tackled the more controversial issue of the presentation of guilt-as-
suming hypotheticals to opinion character witnesses. 73 The panel in Kel-
logg aligned itself with other circuits by recognizing that guilt-assuming
hypothetical questions can "be problematic if [they arise] in circumstances
that implicate the presumption of innocence or otherwise undermine due
process." 74 Nevertheless, the court diverged from the majority of the cir-
68. See id. at 195-96 ("We agree with the consensus of the Courts of Appeals
that posing a guilt-assuming hypothetical to a reputation character witness is
improper.").
69. See id. at 196 (pointing out that nature of reputation witnesses' testimony
and prior holding in Curtis support prohibition on use of guilt-assuming questions
with respect to reputation witnesses).
70. See United States v. Curtis, 644 F.2d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 1981) (elaborating
on basic and important distinction between opinion and reputation character wit-
nesses with respect to scope of cross-examination allowed) (emphasis added).
71. Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196.
72. See id. (adopting bright-line rule prohibiting use of guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals to challenge reputation character witnesses).
73. See id. at 196-97 (addressing admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals
with respect to opinion character witnesses).
74. See id. (agreeing with other circuit courts that guilt-assuming hypotheticals
may create problems in criminal trials under certain circumstances).
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cuits by holding that these problems are "a possibility [but] by no means a
certainty."
75
The court pointed out that under Rule 404, a witness testifying as to
his or her own opinion of the defendant is "open to cross-examination on
how additional facts would affect that opinion."7 6 The court stated that
guilt-assuming hypotheticals were significantly probative because re-
sponses to such questions would assist in testing "both the witness' bias
and the witness' own standards by asking whether the witness would retain
a favorable opinion of the defendant even if the evidence at trial proved
guilt. '77 In light of the compelling function these types of questions
would serve-mainly in assisting the jury in its consideration of the charac-
ter witnesses' credibility-the Kellogg court declined to adopt a bright-line
rule barring their use when cross-examining opinion character wit-
nesses. 78 In support of its decision, the court noted that it found "nothing
inherent in guilt-assuming hypotheticals, in the abstract, that makes them
unfairly prejudicial, let alone so prejudicial as to constitute a per se viola-
tion of due process."79
3. Application to Kellogg's Case
After rejecting a bright-line rule of invalidity for guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals asked of opinion character witnesses, the Kellogg court set out
to consider the validity of the particular question posed to Kellogg's wit-
ness.8 0 In upholding the district court's decision to allow the question
posed to Kellogg's opinion witness, the appellate court cited three primary
bases for its judgment.8 ' First, the prosecution emphasized the "hypothet-
ical nature" of the question so "as to allay any real concern about under-
mining the presumption of innocence." 82 Second, only one such question
75. See id. at 196 (declining to adopt bright-line rule of invalidity for use of
guilt-assuming questions with respect to opinion character witnesses, unlike major-
ity of circuits).
76. See id. (noting that accused bears risk of having his or her character wit-
nesses challenged by prosecution on cross-examination). For a discussion of the
Federal Rules of Evidence that govern the use of character evidence in criminal
trials and the risks that are taken when calling character witnesses, see supra notes
14-26 and accompanying text.
77. See id. (quoting United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 544 (2d Cir. 1990)
(Mukasey, J., concurring)).
78. See id. (rejecting bright-line rule of invalidity and noting that "a person
testifying regarding a present opinion should be open to cross[-]examination on
how additional facts would affect that opinion").
79. See id. (holding that guilt-assuming hypotheticals do not categorically un-
dermine presumption of innocence in violation of due process).
80. See id. (applying newly adopted rule of admissibility to cross-examination
of character witness in Kellogg's case).
81. For a discussion of the principles underlying the Third Circuit's decision
to uphold the use of a guilt-assuming hypothetical in Kellogg, see infra notes 82-86
and accompanying text.
82. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 (noting clear hypothetical nature of question
as factor favoring admissibility).
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had been asked during Kellogg's trial; thus, the appellate court was able to
distinguish Kellogg's case from one in which the "prosecution repeatedly
'foist[ed] its theory of the case on the jury." 83
Finally, the appellate court noted that Kellogg was not a case in which
the prosecution had repeatedly assured the trial judge of the good faith
basis for the question, thereby creating an inference in the mind of the
jurors that the prosecution had more evidence of guilt than that shown on
the record. 84 Although the court upheld the question posed to Kellogg's
character witness, the court reiterated that it was not suggesting or hold-
ing that the use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals would be proper in all
circumstances.8 5 Rather, the court held that consideration should be
given to the facts and circumstances in each individual case, and that an
individual determination should be made thereon.
8 6
C. Judge Roth's Concurring Opinion
In a brief concurring opinion, Judge Roth expressed her dissatisfac-
tion with the court's analysis.8 7 Judge Roth based her opinion on a funda-
mental principle of our justice system-"that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused." 88 Judge Roth posited that although
the distinction relied upon by the majority as between reputation and
opinion evidence may have some relationship to the probative value of a
guilt-assuming hypothetical, such a distinction cannot possibly affect the
damage such questions inflict on the presumption of innocence.8 9 In
Judge Roth's view, the guilt-assuming hypothetical posed to Kellogg's wit-
ness was improper, and the extent of its "hypothetical nature" could not
allay the threat that it posed to the presumption of innocence that Kellogg
83. See id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 177 (7th Cir.
1984)) (citing fact that guilt-assuming hypotheticals were not used consistently
throughout trial to force theory of case on jury as factor favoring admissibility).
84. See id. (noting fact that prosecution did not attempt to make inference
that there was more evidence than currently on record regarding Kellogg's guilt as
factor favoring admissibility by referring to facts in United States v. Oshatz, 912
F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir. 1990)).
85. See id. at 197 ("To be clear, we are not suggesting, let alone holding, that
guilt-assuming hypotheticals can properly be asked of opinion character witnesses
in every case.").
86. See id. (noting that admissibility turns on "facts and circumstances" of indi-
vidual cases).
87. See id. at 203 (Roth, J., concurring) ("The majority concludes that the
question asked of [Kellogg's witness] (who offered both opinion and reputation
testimony) was relevant and its hypothetical nature was clear, thereby assuaging
any concern with respect to the presumption of innocence. I respectfully
disagree.").
88. See id. (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978)) (noting that
touchstone principle of United States criminal justice system is presumption of
innocence in favor of defendant).
89. See id. (arguing that distinction between opinion and reputation character
witnesses is pertinent to analysis of probative value but is irrelevant to considera-
tion of prejudicial effect).
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was entitled to receive. 90 In accordance with the majority of the circuit
courts, Judge Roth advocated for the adoption of a bright-line prohibition
on the use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals. 9 1
IV. PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR THIRD CIRCUIT PRACTITIONERS
Although a great deal of controversy still surrounds the propriety of
guilt-assuming hypotheticals in the abstract, Kellogg provides meaningful
guidance to attorneys practicing in the Third Circuit.9 2 Defense counsel
and prosecutors alike can gain valuable insight from Kellogg, the following
guidelines-extracted from Kellogg and other cases like it-may prove
helpful when defending against or proffering guilt-assuming hypotheticals
in the Third Circuit.
9 3
A. Practical Guidelines for Defense Counsel
In light of the Third Circuit's decision in Kellogg, defense counsel
practicing in the Third Circuit should take note of the following guide-
lines in order to protect their clients against improper prosecutorial use of
guilt-assuming hypotheticals.
94
(1) The Third Circuit does not allow guilt-assuming hypotheticals to
be asked of reputation character witnesses. 95 Therefore, defense counsel
should consider limiting character witnesses to providing reputation testi-
mony, thereby avoiding any possible use of guilt-assuming hypothetical
questions. 9
6
90. See id. at 204 ("It is not clear to me ... that this guilt-assuming hypotheti-
cal was sufficiently hypothetical to be permissible.").
91. Cf id. at 203 (noting serious prejudicial effect of guilt-assuming hypotheti-
cals and seeming to agree with majority of courts that have held them inadmissible
as categorically inconsistent with presumption of innocence).
92. See Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 474-75 (providing guidelines similar to
those which can be extracted from Third Circuit's holding in Kellogg); Saltzburg,
supra note 16, at 49 (same).
93. Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 474-75 (noting guidelines similar to those
listed for defense and prosecution); Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 49 (same).
94. Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 49 (explaining that one can safeguard against
"the prosecution's abuse of the guilt-assuming hypothetical" by following guide-
lines that have been suggested in various circuit court opinions).
95. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 195-96 (majority opinion) ("We agree with the con-
sensus of the Courts of Appeals that posing a guilt-assuming hypothetical to a repu-
tation character witness is improper.").
96. See id. at 196 (drawing distinction between opinion and reputation charac-
ter witnesses with respect to admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals);
Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 49 (noting that choice of testimony to be provided by
character witness will "dictate the cross-examination that will be permitted"); TRIAL
TACTICS, supra note 5, at 109 (same); see also Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 475 n.102
(pointing out that reputation witnesses may be asked "have you heard" type ques-
tions but not guilt-assuming hypotheticals). To ensure that guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals are not posed to reputation witnesses, "the defense must make it clear
to the court, the prosecution and the jury in its case-in-chief that the witness is
testifying only to the defendant's reputation . .. prior to the point in time when
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(2) Reputation witnesses called by the defense should be instructed
to refrain from volunteering any personal opinion of the defendant on
direct examination that would "open the door" to guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals on cross-examination.
97
(3) In light of the fact that reputation witnesses may not be asked
guilt-assuming hypotheticals, defense counsel must remain aware of the
nature of the testimony provided by each character witness called.
98
(4) Defense counsel should raise an objection to any guilt-assuming
hypothetical posed to a reputation character witness, so that a reviewing
court will not be forced to apply the plain error standard of review. 99
(5) Although jury instructions may be given by the trial judge sua
sponte-as was done in Kellogg-defense counsel should ensure that in-
structions be given to the jury regarding the nature of the testimony and
the charges against him were filed." Id. at 466 n.63. If a character witness does, in
fact, offer both reputation and opinion testimony, the prosecution may question
the witness using both specific instances of prior conduct and guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals. See id. at 475 n.102 (noting that witness providing opinion and reputa-
tion testimony is subject to broader depth of questioning on cross-examination).
97. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 (holding that character witness providing opin-
ion testimony may be questioned using guilt-assuming hypotheticals); Saltzburg,
supra note 16, at 49 (noting that witnesses offering opinion testimony are suscepti-
ble to broader range of questioning on cross-examination); TRiAL TAcTics, supra
note 5, at 109 (same).
98. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196-97 (noting that admissibility of guilt-assuming
hypothetical turns on nature of testimony offered on direct-examination);
Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 49 ("[I]t is always improper to cross-examine a reputa-
tion witness by asking whether, if the witness assumes something to be true, reputa-
tion would change. The only proper cross-examination of a reputation witness
addresses what the witness has heard in the community.").
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1949) ("On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.") (emphasis added); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("A plain error that affects
substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's
attention."); Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 80 (2003) ("[F]ailure to object
to trial error ordinarily limits an appellate court to review for plain error."); Jones
v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 374 (1999) (noting that failure to raise objection at
trial subjects error to "limited appellate review for plain error"); United States v.
Johnson, No. 06-2145, 2007 WL 2719154, at *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 19, 2007) (noting
that plain error standard of review applies when no objection is made to admission
of challenged evidence at time of trial); United States v. Keyes, No. 05-1684, 2007
WL 108295, at *10 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 2007) (same); United States v. Sutton, No. 05-
1808, 2006 WL 3227805, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 6, 2006) ("We typically review argu-
ments not raised in the District Court for plain error."); Saltzburg, supra note 16,
at 49 ("[T]imely objections need to be made to [guilt-assuming hypotheticals] or
review for plain error will be the only recourse."); TRiAL TAcrics, supra note 5, at
109 (same). The plain error standard of review is particularly deferential, and
does not favor the party claiming error. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,
631 (2002) (explaining that under plain error test appellate court can correct er-
ror not raised at trial only when there is "(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that
affects substantial rights") (internal quotations omitted).
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the weight to be accorded thereto, first at the time the guilt-assuming hy-
pothetical is asked, and again at the completion of trial. 100
B. Practical Guidelines for Prosecutors
Although the Third Circuit's holding in Kellogg did not completely
restrict the admissibility of guilt-assuming hypotheticals, such questions
may only be asked under limited circumstances.10' The Kellogg decision
provides a roadmap to admissibility, and prosecutors can maximize their
ability to proffer guilt-assuming hypotheticals by adhering to the following
guidelines. 0
2
(1) Prosecutors must remain aware of the nature of the testimony
offered by each of the defense's character witnesses, because a defense
character witness may not be asked a guilt-assuming hypothetical if he or
she has only proffered reputation testimony.
10 3
(2) When posing a guilt-assuming hypothetical question to an opin-
ion character witness, the prosecution should emphasize the hypothetical
nature of the question.
10 4
(3) To the greatest extent possible, any hypothetical question should
be framed in general terms, and should not include particular details of
the charges at bar.'
0 5
100. See Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 476 (noting that jury "instruction should
be given both at the moment that the prosecutor inquires into the charges at bar
(particularly if the defense asserts an objection that the court overrules) and again
at the time of the jury charge"); see also STEVEN GOODE & OLIN Guy WELLBORN III,
COURTROOM EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 99 (1995) ("The jury should be instructed that
they are to consider any incidents brought out in cross-examination only as bear-
ing on the credibility and weight of the witnesses' testimony." (quoting United
States v. Apfelbaum, 621 F.2d 62, 65 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980))).
101. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 197 (explaining that although guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals are not proper in all cases, certain circumstances may permit their
use).
102. See Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 474 (noting that adherence to guidelines
similar to those provided will prohibit abuse of guilt-assuming questions thereby
maximizing possibility of admission).
103. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 ("[P]osing a guilt-assuming hypothetical to a
reputation character witness is improper."); Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 475
("[T]he prosecutor must differentiate the reputation witness from the opinion wit-
ness and then tailor her inquiry into the charges at bar accordingly. If the witness
testifies as to her opinion of the defendant, then the prosecutor may use guilt-as-
suming hypotheticals . . ").
104. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 (allowing admission of guilt-assuming hypo-
thetical posed to opinion character witness partly because "hypothetical nature was
so emphasized as to ally any real concern about undermining the presumption of
... innocence"); Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 475 (noting that prosecution should
emphasize hypothetical nature of guilt-assuming question to increase likelihood of
admission).
105. See Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 475 ("The questions should be phrased in
general terms and should not give too much detail.").
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(4) Any guilt-assuming hypothetical asked should be phrased in a
succinct manner and should not unnecessarily further the prosecution's
theory of the case.
10 6
(5) Any guilt-assuming hypothetical should be based on evidence
that is already before the jury, and should not introduce any novel evi-
dence or testimony. 10
7
(6) The prosecution should also take care in delivering the guilt-as-
suming question to ensure that it is not posed in a "cynical or negatively
suggestive" manner.
10 8
(7) Notwithstanding all of the suggestions noted above, prosecutors
should use guilt-assuming hypotheticals sparingly, so as to reduce the pos-
sibility that their aggregate effect will be found to impermissibly under-
mine the presumption of innocence.' 0 9
Although the Third Circuit now permits the use of guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals when cross-examining opinion character witnesses, a number
of factors counsel against their frequent use. 1 10 First, prosecutors have a
number of tools at their disposal-such as inquiry into specific instances
of past misconduct-that are highly effective and do not raise concerns
regarding fairness.' Second, given the overwhelmingly negative re-
106. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 (allowing admission of guilt-assuming hypo-
thetical in part because prosecution did not attempt to "foist[ ] its theory of the
case on the jury" through use of such questions (citing United States v. Williams,
738 F.2d 172, 177 (7th Cir. 1984))); Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 475 ("The prosecu-
tor should not propound her theory of how the crime was committed, but should
instead state the question succinctly.").
107. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 (permitting admission of guilt-assuming hypo-
thetical partially because prosecution did not attempt to suggest that there was
more evidence of guilt than already disclosed in record (citing United States v.
Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir. 1990))); Plaskowitz, supra note 4, at 476 ("The
guilt-assuming hypothetical should be based on testimony that has already been
offered; the question should present nothing new to the jury.").
108. See id. at 476 (noting that prosecutor should refrain from posing ques-
tion in argumentative or sensational manner). Plaskowitz noted that phrasing
such questions in a hostile manner may actually be counterproductive because "a
cross-examiner who resorts to misrepresentation, insinuation, or to knowingly put-
ting a witness in a false light before a jury finds herself discredited not only with
the court, but with the very jury before whom she appears." Plaskowitz, supra note
4, at 477 (internal quotations omitted).
109. See Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 196 (stating fact that only one guilt-assuming hy-
pothetical was asked during course of trial was ground for admission of such
question).
110. For a discussion of the risks associated with the admission of character
evidence in general, and particularly with guilt-assuming hypotheticals, see supra
notes 5-6, 15 and accompanying text.
111. See FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 405.02[12], at
405-14 ("The cross-examiner already has sufficient ways to examine character wit-
nesses concerning things they have heard or know about the defendant. There is
no reason to allow hypothetical questions to be based on the facts of the case being
tried.").
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sponse that guilt-assuming hypotheticals have received within the courts
and in scholarly discourse, prosecutors may wish to pursue different meth-
ods of cross-examination in anticipation of an adverse Supreme Court rul-
ing on the issue. 112 Finally, to ensure that criminal defendants continue
to receive fair trials, and to remain faithful to the presumption of inno-
cence, prosecutors should ideally refrain from using guilt-assuming hy-
potheticals; or in the alternative, should formulate such questions in
accordance with the provided guidelines to minimize the adverse conse-
quences associated with their admission. 1
13
Eric M. Kubilus
112. Cf Posting of Brett Sweitzer to Third Circuit Blog, http://circuit3.blog
spot.com/2007/12/court-widens-circuit-split-on-guilt.html (Dec. 19, 2007) (noting
widening of circuit split caused by Kellogg decision and suggesting Supreme Court
review may be approaching). For a discussion of the negative light in which guilt-
assuming hypotheticals have been cast, see supra notes 6, 31 and accompanying
text.
113. For a discussion of the factors that counsel against the use of guilt-assum-
ing hypotheticals and adherence to strict guidelines when using such questions,
see supra notes 5-6, 15 and accompanying text.
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